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This paper examines the credibility of the Federal Reserve's monetary targets
using survey data on money growth forecasts to measure market expectations.
The paper provides two main results. First, there is strong evidence that the
monetary targets were credible over the 1978 to 1993 sample period, although
credibility fell in the post-1985 period. Second, both the federal government
deficit and Federal Reserve reputation of controlling money growth within the
target ranges have a significant impact on credibility.Introduction
In response to congressional pressure, the Federal Reserve adopted annual
monetary growth targets and began announcing them to the public in 1975. Many
economists view the establishment of monetary targets as a positive
development for two reasons. First, money growth targets allow central banks
to signal their intentions to get tough on inflation. If they do this in a
credible manner, then the social costs of pursuing anti-inflationary policies
can, presumably, be reduced.1 Second, credible monetary targets cause the
money supply to follow a mean-reverting process. To the extent that there is
a strong relationship between the money supply and the aggregate price level,
the targets cause the latter to also be mean-reverting, thus reducing long-
term price level uncertainty in the economy. Lower uncertainty about future
prices, in turn, raises the allocative efficiency of capital markets and leads
to increased economic growth. 2
The 20 year history of monetary targeting in the United States provides
economists with considerable data that can be examined to shed light on many
important policy questions. This paper focuses on two. First, to what extent
has the public viewed the monetary targets as credible? That is, has the
Federal Reserve been able to influence expectations in the economy by setting
monetary targets? Second, what factors
targets to rise and fall?
Up to this point, no consensus has
cause the credibility of the monetary
emerged in the literature about these
questions. For example, Frankel and Hardouvelis (19851, and Hardouvelis and
Barnhart (1989) have argued that the Federal Reserve's credibility as an
inflation fighter rose when they placed greater weight on monetary targets
following the change in operating procedures in late 1979. In addition,
Friedman (19881 surmises that the credibility of the monetary targets fell
after 1982:In the eyes of many economists, the Federal Reserve has been
steering without a rudder since it effectively abandoned its
commitment to monetary growth targets in 1982 (p.52) . ..after
mid-1982 there was no reason for anyone to find the Federal
Reserve's commitment to its stated money growth targets
credible (p. 65).
In contrast, Eichenbaum (1992) argues that the Federal Reserve has had much
more difficulty establishing credibility:
. . . the issue of monetary targeting in the United States just
isn't interesting from a positive point of view. We Never had
it. What the Fed targeted in 1979 was high nominal interest
rates, not low growth rates of Ml. Surely no one believed
otherwise - now or then. (p. 2321
These disparate views about the Federal Reserve's ability to set credible
monetary targets suggest the need for additional empirical work.
This paper examines the credibility of the Federal Reserve's monetary
targets. To do this, the paper uses survey data on money growth forecasts
collected on a quarterly basis since 1978 by the Washington Bond C Money
Market Report. This data provides us with a unique opportunity to examine
whether the monetary targets have influenced money growth expectations and,
if they have, how the influence has changed over time. Moreover, we can use
the data to explore whether credibility has responded to:  i) the nature of the
monetary regime employed by the Federal Reserve, ii) the Federal Reserve's
reputation in hitting the targets, and iii) the stance of fiscal policy.
The paper is outlined as follows. The next section discusses previous
work that has attempted to measure credibility. Section two presents the
Federal Reserve's annual and near-term monetary targets and separates the
deviations from the annual targets into desired and undesired components. The
third section discusses the survey data used in the study. The fourth section
constructs the empirical model. The main empirical results are presented in
sections five and six. The final section concludes the paper and discusses
the policy implications.
21. Previous Work
One approach that has been employed to investigate the existence of
credibility is to examine inflation-unemployment trade-offs or term structure
equations across different monetary regimes. If a new anti-inflationary
regime is credible, then a Phillips curve, estimated over some previous
regime, should over-predict the rate of inflation during the period when the
anti-inflation regime in place. Similarly, a credible anti-inflationary
regime should, everything else held constant, cause expected inflation and
long-term interest rates to fall. Using these approaches, Blanchard (19841
found evidence that the policy regime put in place by the Federal Reserve in
1979 attained some credibility.
Blackburn and Christensen (1989) point out that both of these approaches
have drawbacks. First, the Phillips curve approach focuses on variables that
adjust sluggishly to changes in the environment and thus are "not well suited
for testing the forward-looking aspects of rational forecasting that are
endemic to the credibility hypothesis." Second, term structure models do not
provide precise results because it is difficult to disentangle the impact on
long-term rates of, on the one hand, lower inflationary expectations and, on
the other, the effect of tight money and higher current short-term rates.
Third, both the Phillips curve and term structure approaches might produce
misleading results if the prediction errors from these models are not due
solely to the missing "credibility variable".
One way to overcome these problems is to construct more direct tests of
the credibility hypothesis using survey data to measure market expectations.
This is the approach used by Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) and Hardouvelis
and Barnhart (1989) to investigate the Federal Reserve's credibility as an
inflation fighter during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In particular, theyuse the change in the weekly money stock forecasted by approximately 45 f-ed
watchers whose forecasts are collected each Tuesday by Money Market Services
Incorporated. These forecasts are used to gauge the reaction of commodity
prices to unexpected changes in the Ml money supply. These researchers argue
----..__A that the Federal Reserve's credibility as an inflation fighter is measur-eu by
the response of commodity prices to unexpected increases in the money supply.
If the response is negative (i.e., unexpected increases in the money supply
X---1 I-..--*--- L- L-1 I-..- Lt.-+ J?..C.._^ _^_^.r ,,,,.+I. ai,d thus :r\c,m+:rr.. .,: 11 1eau lllV~SLU1 5 I.” ue’lJ.t!vt! LllclL  I ULU‘ t: Ill”‘lcy 8;’ VW L‘, 1111  J.cILI”II Will be
lower and they respond to this expectation by shifting out of commodities and
into money), the Federal Reserve has credibility.
Frankel and Hardouvelis use this approach to show that the Federal
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1979, but that they did following the Volker-announced regime shift.
Hardouvelis and Barnhart use a Kalman Filter model to show that credibility
rose slowly following the October 1979 regime shift and that credibility
varies with the rate of inflation.
One potential problem with using commodity prices reactions to
unanticipated money growth to measure credibility is that the relationship
between money and inflation may not be stable. 3 That is, the correlation
between commodity prices and unexpected money might weaken not because the
Federal Reserve has lost credibility, but because market participants believe
that money growth no longer has a strong impact on inflation. In fact, it has
been noted by many researchers (see Friedman 1988) that the correlation
between money growth and inflation has deteriorated significantly in the
post-1982 period. This potential problem is magnified when the analysis
focuses on long periods of time as we do in this study. We can avoid this
problem by focusing directly on money growth expectations rather than
inflation expectations.2. Monetary Targets
A+ The Targets
o- --
Table 1 presents the upper and lower ranges of the annual Ml and M2 money
growth targets set by the Federal Reserve since 1975. As the Table indicates,
the Federal Reserve has used two different approaches to monetary targeting
since 1975. Prior to 1979, the Federal Reserve announced annual target ranges
for monetary growth on a quarterly basis using the previous quarter as the
base period. 4 Each quarter the ranges were moved forward one quarter, thus
causing the level of the aggregate implied by the new target to often differ
greatly from the level implied by the original target.
The built-in base drift generated by a shifting base period prompted much
criticism of the Federal Reserve. Following passage of the Full Employment
and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 (the Humphrey-Hawkins Act), a new procedure
for setting the monetary targets was established that was intended to restrict
base drift. Beginning in 1979, the Federal Reserve established targets for
the current calendar year during the February meeting of the Federal Open
Market Committee (FMOC). The FMOC subsequently reviewed these targets at its
July meeting and set preliminary targets for the following year. In all but
three cases (at the February 1983, July 1983, and July 1985 meetings), the
fourth quarter from the previous year was maintained as the base period
throughout the year. 5
Table 1 shows that the FMOC formally altered Ml or M2 targets at the July
meeting on only three occasions under the new regime: 1983 (Ml), 1985 (Ml) and
1993 (M2). The Table also chronicles several cases when the FMOC explicitly
stated that actual money growth would deviate from the target levels although
the targets were not formally altered. For example, the FMOC stated at its
February 1985 meeting that "growth in the monetary aggregates in the upperpart of their ranges for 1985 may be appropriate...".
It is important to point out that the preliminary annual targets set in
July for the following year often deviated from those set for the current
year. Similarly, the annual targets set in February often differed from the
preiiminary targets estabiished at the Juiy meeting in the previous year.
Finally, Table 1 does not report targets for Ml beginning in 1987 because the
Federal Reserve ceased targeting Ml at this time.
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near-term targets since 1975. Prior to October 1979, near-term target ranges
were established at each monthly FMOC meeting and set with one month horizons.
Beginning in October of 1979, the FMOC met less frequently and the horizon for
nc.=r-tnrm  targets was 11bc.41 C-I 111 lnnuthnnerl te tb_ree mnnthc 1~"L~C""""U The nr=.ar-t~~~.  targets  wpre a,a”IaI.*L. *..w .I__.
intended to be a tool for achieving the annual targets. If the money stock
moved outside one of the annual ranges, the near-term target was suppose to be
set to bring the money stock back into the range. If the money stock remained
within the annual ranges, the near-term target was set to keep it there.
However, as Meulendyke (1988, p. 13) points out the FMOC "sometimes approved
growth rates that stretched out the period for bringing money back on track,
and on occasion it acknowledged that target growth probably would not be
achieved within the year." According to, Meulendyke the FOMC allowed the
money stock to deviate from the annual target ranges for two reasons. First,
they were often skeptical about staff forecasts. Second, they were frequently
unwilling to pay the high cost associated with raising the federal funds rate
to the level needed to bring the money stock back into line.
B. Actual Versus Targeted Money Stocks
The ability of the Federal Reserve to hit their monetary growth targets
has received considerable attention from economists, with increased attentionusually given at times when there have been large divergences. To measure the
Federal Reserve's success in hitting the targets, we proceed in two stages.
First, we subtract the target money stock (the stock implied by the midpoint
of the annual target ranges) from the from the actual money stock and divide
this difference by the target money stock. Second, a four-quarter summation
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solely to seasonal factors. That is, the percentage deviations should be
larger on average towards the end of the year if the money stock does not
follow a mean-reverting process. To facilitate comparison with the near-term
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Four-quarter moving summations of the percentage deviations of Ml and M2
from their target levels (DEVlSUM and DEV2SUMl are illustrated in Figures 1
and 2 respectively. Figure 1 shows that Ml remained relatively close to the
midpoint of its target up to 1981, then drifted persistently above the target
level beginning in 1981. Interestingly, the Ml deviations reach their highest
level in 1986, the last year in which the Federal Reserve formally announced
annual Ml targets. The narrower range for M2 deviations illustrated in Figure
2 suggests that the Federal Reserve has had greater success targeting this
aggregate. However, M2 was generally above the midpoint of its target ranges
prior to 1987 and M2 has continually drifted below the target level in recent
years. The Federal Reserve ceased announcing M2 targets in 1993. As was the
case for Ml, deviations in this aggregate reached their highest level (in
absolute value) immediately before the Federal Federal stopped targeting it.
C. The Source of Deviations
The fact that the Federal Reserve stopped establishing Ml and M2 targets
following periods when these aggregates deviated from their target by
increasing magnitudes raises two questions. First, did reduced controlabilitylead to large and persistent deviations and subsequently to the deemphasis of
Ml and then M2 targeting in monetary policy? Or, alternatively, did a reduced
desire by the Federal Reserve to control the aggregates lead to the deviations
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2?
One way to address these questions is to utilize the near-term targets to
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desired and undesired components. As discussed earlier, desired deviations
arise either because the FMOC is skeptical about staff forecasts or they are
unwilling to face the high cost associated with bringing the money stock back
intn line 6
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the target levels is lack of monetary control.
To demonstrate how deviations of the money stock from the target level
can be decomposed into desired and undesired components, Figure 3 shows a
hypothetical path for the money stock and the midpoints of the annual and
near-term target ranges. The Figure shows that the near-term target set in
the third quarter is consistent with moving the money stock to the annual
target level by the end of the quarter. At the end of the third quarter the
actual money stock exceeds the level implied by the near-term and annual
targets and this difference is the undesired deviation. The near-term target
set for the fourth quarter implies base drift; money growth targeted over the
quarter is such that the money stock is expected to reach a level that exceeds
the annual target level. The difference between near-term and annual target
levels at the end of the quarter is the desired deviation. The difference
between the actual money stock and the near-term target level is the undesired
deviation.
Four-quarter summations of the percentage undesired deviations for Ml and
M2 are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 respectively. 7 The Figures show that a
relatively small proportion of the money stocks deviations are undesired.
8This finding suggests that most of deviation  of the money stocks from annual 
target levels  over the last two decades can be accounted  for by base drift and 
not by lack of monetary control.  However, there are several interesting 
exceptions.  First, undesired  M2 deviations  rose persistently  between 1979 and 
1981.  This was most likely  due to uncontrollability  caused by the emergence 
of NOW accounts and deregulation.  Second and more importantly,  note that a 
large fraction of the Ml deviation in 1986  was undesired.  This finding 
suggests that lack of controlability  may have been an important  factor 
contributing  to the Federal Reserve's  decision to cease formal targeting  of 
Ml at this time.  8  A similar lack of monetary control is not observed for M2 
in 1993  when targets  for it are no longer  set. 
3. Measuring  Money Growth Expectations 
To measure money growth expectations,  we use survey data collected  on a 
quarterly basis by the Washington  Bond G Money Market Report (the  Report).  9 
Starting in 1978, the Report has collected  money growth forecast from a group 
of financial sector economists  at the end of each quarter.  10  The forecasts are 
quarter-over-quarter  projections  of money growth one and two quarters into the 
future.  Figure 4 illustrates  the mean forecasts  of the group for one and two 
quarter horizons.  To our knowledge this is the only survey that provides 
money growth forecasts over these relatively  long horizons. 
Three features of the survey  data warrant discussion.  First, the money 
stock forecasted  by the group changes  over the sample; the group forecasts  Ml 
growth from 1978:Q2 to 1983:Q3  and 1984:Q3  to 1987:l (the  shaded periods in 
Figure 41, and M2 growth from 1982:Q4 to 1984:Q2  and 1987:Q2 to 1993:Q4.11 
Since the money stock forecasted  by the group generally coincides  with the 
aggregate emphasized  by the Federal Reserve in it targeting  efforts,  l2 a 
finding that the targets  do not influence  expectations  can not occur because 
9 the group and the Federal Reserve are focusing on different aggregates.
Second, the group forecasts money growth using the current quarter
stock as the base before it is known. Fortunately, the Report provides
money
the
group with a projected growth rate of the money stock for the current quarter.
Using this projection and knowledge of 'K
----__ -L--l_ LL- tne previous quarter's money SLVCK, LLlt:
current quarter money stock can be estimated.
Third, a common criticism leveled at the use of survey data to measure




well-informed forecasts. It is difficult to ascertain whether this is
not with regard to the forecasts provided by the Report. However,
researcher have found that the interest rate forecasts provided by the
17
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of financial market participants and this is precisely the group that should
be most concerned about the credibility of the Federal Reserve's targets.
4. Empirical Specifications
The Federal Reserve's monetary targets should influence money growth
expectations if they are credible. To examine this effect on expectations, we
propose the following model:
'T m
'e m =
t,t+i with probability /3,
t,t+i 'NT m
t,t+1 with probability (l-pt)
i = 1,2 (1)
where me t t+i is the market's money growth expectation, obtained from the
,
Report, at time t for i quarters into the future; m: t+i is expected money
,
growth when the monetary targets are perfectly credible (the target model),
'NT mt t+i is expected money growth based on some alternative (non-target) model;
,
and p, (0 s /3 t I 1) is the probability that money growth is governed by the
target model. That is, /3, measures target credibility.
10To estimate m: t+i, we take the annualized growth rate between the money
,
stock at t and the level implied by the midpoint of the target range at the
end of the calendar year. This approach is iiiustrated in Figure 5 for the
two-quarter-ahead forecast. Note that preliminary targets for the following
year are used in the construction of mi t+2 in the third quarter and fourth
,
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where m" and mL
80 80 are, respectively, the upper and lower annual money growth
'PU 'PL ranges for 1980 announced in February; rnsl and rnsl are, respectively, the
preliminary upper and lower ranges for 1981 announced in July of 1980; and
M and M
79:4 8. 1 are money stock levels in the fourth quarter of 1979 and the
first quarter of 1980 respectively. One-quarter-ahead money growth forecasts
are constructed in an analogous manner.
Many different specifications could be used to represent the non-target
model. Its seems reasonable, however, to limit the analysis to simple time
series models augmented with important state variables that are believed to
drive money growth. One such state variable is the deficit. When there is a
non-zero probability that the Federal Reserve will monetize the deficit,
larger deficits should lead to expectations of higher monetary growth. Given
this consideration, the non-target model we consider is:
'NT . .
mt.t+i = a + 7-m + r-m
1t 2 t-1 + AsDEFt + ut i = 1,2 (2)
where ut N N(0, ~~1; mt and mt_r are contemporaneous and lagged money growth;
and DEF+ is the ratio of the federal government deficit to gross domestic c
11product.
Combining the target and non-target models, money growth expectations can
be written as:
-e ,iT+,+ (l-B,) * mt,t+i = Is + ynt 1 + haDEFt + ut
I
i = 1,2 (3)
or
se .
m a t,t+i = t
+ p iT +cm +dr;l t t+i tt t t-1 + etDEFt + E
t
i = 1,2 (4)
where:
a t = aW-/3tl,
et =  w-fp,
& = with E N t (l-B, )ut t N(O, (1-@t1202)
Two features of (4) warrant comment. First, the coefficient estimate for &:+,
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monetary targets changes over time, then p, should be time-varying. Second,
the existence of time-varying credibility causes the disturbance term of the
reduced form equation to display heteroscedaticity.
5. Empirical Results
A. Time-Invariant Model
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coefficients are not time-varying. Due to the potential for heteroscedaticity
generated by time-varying credibility, the models are estimated with method-
of-moment techniques to obtain consistent estimates of the covariance matrix
and standard errors. Also, error terms in models that use two-quarter-ahead
forecasts should follow, at a minimum, a first-order moving-average process
because the forecast horizon in these models is longer than the observation
12interval. This potential source of serial correlation is taken into account
when the method-of-moment procedure is used. 14 Data from the second quarter of





in panel A and B of Table 2 show regression results for
that only includes a constant and the target model money
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that the monetary targets have had a gravitational pull on money growth
expectations. Instead, the negative and highly significant estimates of  /3
suggest that money growth expectations rose when mT t+i fell. However, the high
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statistics) suggest that these models exclude important explanatory variables
and are thus misspecified.
Two important variables missing from regression 1 are contemporaneous and
lagged money growth. In fact, one possible explanation for the negative /3
estimates in Table 2 is that m' t t+i tends to fall and become negative when
,
recent money growth has been high and has moved the money stock above the
midpoint of the target range. In this case, variation in mT i,i+i might be
picking up recent movements in money growth which are themselves important
determinants of money growth expectations as hypothesized in equation  (4).
Regression 2 includes contemporaneous money growth rate and regression 3
includes contemporaneous and lagged money growth. 15 The growth rates have a
positive and highly significant impact on expected money growth and their
inclusion into the models eliminates much of the serial correlation. Also,
panel A shows that /3 is insignificantly different from zero in regressions
that use one-quarter-ahead forecasts. In contrast, panel B shows that /3 is
positive and significantly different from zero at the five percent level when
two-quarter-ahead forecasts are used. When lagged money growth is included,
the size of /3 rises and it becomes more significant. This is an important
13finding. It suggests that while the monetary targets have had iittie impact
on shorter-term money growth expectations, they have had a strong effect on
longer-term expectations. Thus there is evidence that the monetary targets
were credible over the 1978 to 1993 sample.
Pegression 4 in Table 2 adds the deficit-GDP ratio to the model. The
results show that the deficit-GDP ratio has a positive impact on money growth
expectations at both the one- and two-quarter horizons. Note also that the
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when the deficit variable is added and that the t-statistic for  B rises in the
two-quarter-ahead model. This last finding is somewhat surprising because it
suggests that the targets remained credible even when the fiscal landscape of
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the Report believed that part of the deficit increase during the 1980s was
going to be monetized.
B. The Time-Varying Model
Equation (4) shows that fluctuations in credibility cause the reduced
form coefficients linking money growth expectations to its determinants to
become time-varying. To examine whether this is fact the case, we employ
Kalman filter techniques to recursively estimate regression 4 in Table 2.
Estimates over the 1978:Q2 to 1980:Q4 period were used to initialize the
Kalman filter. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the coefficient evolution from the
models estimated with one- and two-quarter forecast horizons respectively.
The solid lines represent the coefficients, while the dashed lines show the
95percent confidence intervals obtained by adding and subtracting two times
standard errors to the coefficients.
Three interesting findings emerge from Figures 6 and 7. First, the
coefficients on contemporaneous money growth are significantly positive
14throughout the sample and begin a continuous rise in 1982. A similar pattern
is observed for the lagged money growth coefficients. Second, the deficit-GDP
coefficient rises and becomes significantly different from zero in 1982.
Third, whiie the p coefficient is not significantiy different from zero
for the one-quarter-ahead forecasts for most of the sample, it is for the  two-
quarter-ahead forecasts. In fact, /3 is insignificantly different from zero
for the two-quarter-ahead forecasts only in the six quarter period beginning
in 1981:Ql and the insignificance over this period may be due to the small
number of observations available early in the sample. The high level of
target credibility exhibited for the 1978:Q2 to 1980:Q4 period is somewhat
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Friedman, 1988, p. 531 that market participants did not take the monetary
targets seriously until sometime after the announced policy change in October
of 1979. However, given the small number of observations upon which the
estimates over this initiai period are made: this findin? needs to be viewed
with a great deal of caution. Overall, the results suggest that the money
targets had a declining impact on expectations beginning in 1985 and the
influence of the targets was replaced by the other variables in the model.
6. Explaining Time-Varying Credibility
The findings of the previous section raise an important question: why has
the credibility of the monetary targets varied over time? The next section
examines factors discussed in the literature that might account for time-
varying credibility and outlines the empirical approach we use to quantify
these effects. 16 The following section discuss the empirical results.
A. Theoretical and Empirical Issues
The first factor that might account for changes in credibility is the
15operating procedure followed by the Federal Reserve. From October 1979 to
October 1982, the Federal Reserve placed greater emphasis on controlling the
money supply. To achieve this objective, it targeted nonborrowed reserves and
aiiowed the federai funds rate to fiuctuate in a much wider range then in the
past. In addition, the Federal Reserve implemented other more technical
measures designed to enhance control over the money supply. To the extent
that these procedural changes were perceived as successful by the public, the
credibility of the monetary targets should have increased. In contrast, the
Federal Reserve placed less emphasis on the monetary targets in the period
ending September 1979 and the period beginning October 1982. 17 These shifts in
However, everything else may not have been held constant across the
policy regimes. As Friedman (1988, p. 551 points out, the actual behavior of
money sunnlv during the nonborrowed reserve regime mieht have undermined the CC-J _ ---_ ---a-- - -__--_ .._-__- -
credibility of the targets. In particular, he contends that many observers
viewed the dramatic rise in money growth volatility during the 1979:Q4-1982:Q2
period as "casting doubt on the strength of the central bank's commitment to
money growth targets..." Given this possible effect, it is not clear that the
1979:Q4-1982:Q3  period should have been characterized by higher credibility.
A second important factor that might affect the credibility of monetary
policy is the stance of fiscal policy. Everything else held constant, the
public should have less confidence that the Federal Reserve will keep money
growth within low target ranges when it is expected to accommodate the




point out, there is some historical and empirical evidence
between monetary and fiscal policy is an important source
16A third potential source of credibility is reputation. One of the
important contributions to the theoretical literature on credibility is the
idea that memory is an important element in repeated games between policy
makers and the public who behaves strategically. For example, Rogoff (1987)
_-..-I builds a model where private sector inflationary expectations are set equal to
the target level if inflation was equal to the target level in the past, and
expected inflation is increased if actual inflation exceeded the target level.
In the context of oiir study, +L:- :....-.,:,.r.  +I.-+ CL... -.W.....-,, w,C.r\bC~V-.,  l ?BV"_fC. L1115 r,U~,llC3 Lll0.L  L,,T; a,l,lUCll  III"IIF;Lca.l  r L.a,tiCLJ
should be less credible following periods when there have been large and
persistent deviations from the targets.
To examine whether these three factors help to explain the time-varying
prcJihi 1 i txr nhcervcwl in Fi CYIII-P  7, _I ~UIYII.L bJ “YLII .“.. .a..&  . A.-...  w we rnnctnlrt  interartinn tpr_n?.c: lJsip_g  p_np_ey .." VVIAY".UV"  **.__.__"&_..
growth expectations based on the target model cm: t+i) and variables (Xt) that
,
are intended to capture the effects discussed above. These terms are then
introduced into the time-invariant version of equation (4): 19
-e .
m = a + p-if t+i + c*m + d.r;l + e*DEF t + g.X.rnT +& t,t+i t t-1 t t,t+1 t
i = 1,z (5)
,
rearranging, we get
‘e m = a + (p + g.XtI*i: t+i + c-m 't + d*r;r + e.DEF + c (6) t,t+i , t-1 t t
i = 1,2
This equation illustrates that a positive coefficient on the interaction term,
g > 0, provides evidence that credibility rises when Xt increases.
Three different variables are used for Xt. The first is a dummy variable
(7982t) that has values of one when the Federal Reserve was emphasizing the
monetary targets (1979:Q4 to 1982:3) and zero in the other periods. The
second is the deficit-GDP ratio discussed earlier. The third attempts to
measure the reputation effect and is constructed from the four-quarter sums of
percentage deviations of the money stock from the target levels discussed in
17Section 3. Specifically, we combine DEVlSUM and DEVZSUM [estimated with
quarterly data) into one series employing, in each quarter, the series that is
constructed from the monetary aggregate being projected by the forecast group.
This variable, DEVSUMt, is illustrated in Figure 8 with the shaded regions in
indicating when the group was forecasting Mi. 20 Recall that it rises when ,oase
drift increases or the monetary aggregates become less controllable. Both
factors should reduce the Federal Reserve's reputation and undermine the
---J'L'lfL.. -AT CL-^ +^l-rr^+- c‘aul”lllLy  “I LIIC: Lcl‘ g;t: Lb.
B. Empirical Results
Before investigating the impact of these three variables on credibility,
we first examine whether credibility changes when the particular monetary
aggregate forecasted by the Report group changes. This is accomplished by
constructing one additional interaction term created by multiplying m: t+i by
,
a dummy variable, Mlt, that is equal to one when the Report group forecasts Ml
and zero when they forecast M2. A positive coefficient on this interaction
term implies that the Federal Reserve had greater credibility when the group
was forecasting Ml (or the periods, approximately, when the Federal Reserve
was targeting Ml). The results from panel A of Table 3 suggest that the
coefficient on this interaction term is equal to zero for the one-quarter-
ahead forecasts. In contrast, panel B shows
and significantly different from zero at the
two-quarter-ahead forecasts are considered.
that this coefficient is
five percent level when
positive
This last finding provides some
evidence that the Ml targets had higher credibility than the M2 targets.
Rows 2 through 4 of Table 3 report results for regressions that include
the other interaction terms. The results presented in row 2 of both panels
suggest that credibility was not higher during the 1979:Q4 to 1982:Q3 period.
That is, g is not significantly different from zero when Xt is set equal to
18the 7982t dummy. One explanation for this finding is that Mlt and 7982t are
highly correlated (i.e., the forecast group forecasted Ml for the entire
_^^A __ 1979:Q4-l98z:yj  periodj and that this multicollinearity lowers the t-statistic
for g. When the model
money-type interaction
was re-estimated (results not reported) leaving the
term out of the model, g remained insignificant in the
percent level) in panel B. Therefore, there is some evidence, albeit weak,
that credibility was marginally higher in the 1979:Q4-1982:Q3  period. 21 The
weakness of the results suggests that the Federal Reserve was only partially
c,rrrnaccf-Ill  * aubbbs*~  UI iR cen-+incing  the p~&lic that they were cerinllc  ahmlt rnntrnl 1  inu “I. 4.VUY UYVI” v_A.__  ----AAe
the money supply following the change in operating procedures in 1979. As
Friedman has suggested, it is possible that the increased volatility of money
growth following the change in procedures undermined the Federal Reserve's
credibility.
Row 3 in panel A and B shows results for a model that includes an
interaction term with Xt equal to the deficit-GDP ratio. Panel A shows that
the coefficient g is negative and significant at the five percent level.
Interestingly, the 8 coefficient is positive and significant for the first
time in the regression that includes the deficit interaction term. Panel B
shows that g is negative and significant at only the ten percent level.
Overall, the results provide some evidence that the higher deficits of the
1980s caused the credibility of the monetary targets to fall.
The final regressions attempt to determine whether the Federal Reserve's
past performance in hitting their monetary targets, or reputation, has an
impact on its credibility. The bottom row in panel A and B of Table 3 shows
results for models that include the interaction term with  Xt = DEVSUMt.
Interestingly, the coefficient on this interaction term, g, is negative and
significantly different from zero at the five percent level in regressions
19that use the one- and two-quarter forecasts. This finding suggests that the
credibility of the targets increased following periods when the Federal
Reserve had been relatively successful hitting the targets.
This effect is visible by comparing the lower-right panel of Figure 7 and
,-.Z I-lgure 8. In particular, note that  i; falls fiOiTi a"uOiit .17 to .G9 fiOiC th2
t
middle of 1985 to the end of 1986. This is the same period when Ml rises
dramatically above the target ranges as can be seen in Figure 8. Thus these
c:-J.Z-_-r-  ,..,lr-C +L..+ W.rr....+-Cirr.. :r. -... : mrrrrr+-%l-.+ 4-qmtnr Acstermininm  mnnat3rTr Lr,lulllg;s  3ugge3L L,IQL ICZ~UCQLI"II 13 all I,,,~", LCIIIL IQLL", u.z L.F;‘ urrAlrL,g  ,,,“,I~ Cc&I y
target credibility.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
This paper examined the credibility of the Federal Reserve's monetary
targets over the 1978 to 1993 sample period. To do this, we explored the
extent to which the targets influenced money growth expectations measured
using survey data. The paper also investigated different factors that might
explain variations in Federal Reserve credibility over time. In the end, two
two main findings emerge from the empirical work.
First, there is strong evidence that the monetary targets had a
significant and time-varying impact on longer-term money growth expectations
over the 1978 to 1993 sample period. As many Fed watchers might expect, the
targets were more credible in the pre-1985 period than the post-1985 period.
Perhaps more surprising, however, is the finding that the targets continued to
be credible in the post-1985 period even though they were deemphasized by the
Federal Reserve during this time.
Second, we show that two factors had a significant impact on credibility.
The first is the federal government deficit - higher deficits lead to lower
target credibility. This finding suggests that the stance of fiscal policy
can undermine a central bank's credibility when it is expected to monetize a
20portion of the deficit.  The second factor is Federal Reserve reputation  of 
controlling  money growth within the target  ranges.  The paper finds that the 
more the actual money stock has deviated from the target level in the past, 
the lower is Federal Reserve credibility.  This result suggests that central 
banks can raise their credibility  by doing what they say they are going to do. 
What policy implications  should  be drawn from these findings?  If there 
was a strong empirical relationship  between money growth and inflation,  then 
these findings could provide a rationale  for central  banks to emphasize 
monetary growth targets.  By taking the targets  seriously  and allowing them to 
constrain  money growth, disinflationary  policies could be pursued at lower 
social costs and long-term  price level  uncertainty  and its associated costs 
could be reduced. 
However, many economists  have become increasingly  skeptical  about the 
existence  of a stable empirical relationship  between money growth and 
inflation.  The experience  of unstable  money demand in the 1980s and empirical 
studies  which demonstrate that the money growth-inflation  correlation  has 
deteriorated in recent  years have gone a long  way to persuade economists that 
the monetary aggregates  do not provide useful intermediate  targets  for the 
conduct of monetary policy.  In fact, these  developments  have gone a long  way 
in convincing the Federal  Reserve in recent  years that it should pay less 
attention to the aggregates  when conducting  policy. 
In light of the fact that monetary aggregates  now play a reduced role in 
the conduct of monetary policy in the U.S., one may question the relevance  of 
empirical  work that examines the historical  experience  of monetary target 
credibility.  In fact, the findings  of this paper are relevant to the current 
policy debate because public perception  of central  bank credibility is a 
crucial factor in the success  of any policy regime,  whether it is one that 
targets  monetary aggregates  or any other variable.  By better understanding 
21 the factors that have influenced monetary target credibility in the past, we
can obtain greater insight into how central banks can achieve credibility for
LL- ____Z_L,-- IL-.. -L_._. I_ I_____L me variaDles  wey cnoose  to Larger;  in the future.
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Ranges for Preliminary Ranges
Current Year for Following Year































































1982 2/l-2 2.5-5.5 6.0-9.0
7/14 2.5-5.5 6.0-9.0






















1988 2/g-10 N.A. 4.0-8.0 87Q4-8884





























Ranges for Preliminary Ranges
Current Year for Following Year









1992 2/4-S N.A. 2.5-6.5
6/30-7/l N.A. 2.5-6.5
1993 2/2-3 N.A. 2.0-6.0
7/6-7 N.A. 1.0-5.0
89Q4-90Q4
89Q4-90Q4 N:A. ’ 2.5-6.5 90Q4:91Q4
90Q4-91Q4 .
90Q4-91Q4 N.A. 2.5:6.5 91Q4:92Q4
91Q4-92Q4 .




'The target is for Ml-A.
2The t-rncrt is for !I-B* cur6-C
3The FMOC announced
its range would be
4The FMOC stated at
"around the top of
at the July meeting that growth in Ml-B near the end of
"acceptable and desirable."
the July 1 meeting that growth of the monetary aggregates
the indicated ranges would be acceptable in light of the
relatively low base period for the Ml target and other factors, and that it
would tolerate for some period of time growth somewhat above the target
range should unusual precautionary demands form money and liquidity be
evident in light of current economic uncertainties."
5A February-March base period was established for M2.
6A second quarter of 1983 base period was established for Ml.
7The FMOC stated at the January meeting that Ml would be given less weight
_L___--_  I- than the broader aggregates due to cnanges in ihe Eii Velocity  aiid &iaiigd
composition of Ml.
8The FMOC agreed that "growth in the monetary aggregates in the upper part of
their ranges for 1985 may be appropriate..."
'A second quarter of 1985 base period was established for Ml.
"Although the Ml range was not formally altered, the FMOC stated that they
would allow money growth to exceed the upper bound.
"The FMOC "agreed that growth in these [the M21 aggregates around the lower
ends of their ranges might be appropriate, depending on the circumstances.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve BulletinTable 2 
Regression  Results for 
Money Growth Expectation  Equations 
*e  m  =  a+  @lilT  +  *  c-m 
t,t+i  t,t+i  t 
+  d.mt 1 +  e*DEFt +  ut  i  =  1,2 
Sample: 1978:Q2-1993:Q2 

























A.  l-Quarter  Forecast  Horizon (i=l) 
-.198  ~  -  - 
(5.33)" 
-.015  .400  - 
(0.50)  (12.11)a 
.024  .358 
(0.84)  (12.571a  (4::74:a 
.020  .348  150 
(0.77)  (11.211a  (1:80)' 
B.  2-Quarter  Forecast  Horizon Ci=21 
.66  67.0a 
1.32  20.8 
1.46  17.4 
1.50  14.7 
-.202  -  -  - 
t2.91ja 
.084  .352  - 
(2.021b  (10.421a 
(4%' 
.307 
(14.561a  (6:;::a 
(4% 
.293 
(11.311a  C6::;;a 
.55  84.6a 
1.48  26.1b 
1.60  16.6 









NOTES: A; t+i is the mean forecast  of money growth over the next i quarters 
from the'kport;  m: t+, is money growth over the next i quarters assuming 
that the money stock converges to the midpoint  of the target range by years 
end; m  and m  t  t 1 are contemporaneous  and lagged  money growth; DEFt is the 
ratio of the federal deficit to gross domestic  product. 
Significance  at the one, five and ten percent levels  given by a,  b  and c 
respectively. Table 3 
Regressions to Explain Time-Varying  Credibility 
‘e  . 
m  =  a+  /3GT  +  cam  t,t+i  t,t+i  t 
+  d.mt_r +  e*DEFt 
+ f.M1*mT  t t,t+i +  g.X;rn:  t+i +  ut  i  =  1,2 
, 
Sample: 1978:Q2-1993:Q2 
X  P  C  d  e  f  g  D-W  Q(l5)  R2  t 
A. l-Quarter  Forecast  Horizon (i=l) 
.004  .346 
f.11)  (11.40)= 
7982t  .009  .345 
(0.26)  (11.42)= 
DEFt  346 
(2::;;b (12:56)= 
DEVSUMt  .045  .346 




.025  - 
C.61) 
.013 
(0.31)  co:~~~ 
.032  -3.334 
(0.91)  (2.321b 
.078  -.623 
(1.83)'  (2.511b 
B.  2-Quarter  Forecast  Horizon (i=2) 
.097  .291  129 
(3.28)= (11.34)=  (6:16)= 
.226 
(3.02)= 




DEFt  .233  .291 
(2.94)= (12.22)= 
(6:%=  .351 
(4.04)= 




(6:$=  .244 
(3.48)= 
.072  - 
(2.111b 
.053  .042 
(1.38)  (0.72) 
.073  -3.366 
(2.391b  (1.67)' 
-.636 
(2.111b 
1.52  13.8  .82 
1.49  14.7  .82 
1.55  15.9  .83 
1.54  16.0  .83 
1.69  10.1  .85 
1.66  10.6  .85 
1.66  11.0  .85 
1.69  10.9  .85 
NOTES: Mlt is a dummy variable that takes on values of one when the Report 
group is forecasting  Ml and zero otherwise.  Xt is one of three different 
variables:  7982t is a dummy variable that takes  on values of one for the 
quarters 1979:Q4 to 1982:Q3  and zero otherwise;  DEVSUMt is the absolute value 
of the four quarter summation  of the percentage  deviations of the money stock 
from annual target levels;  and DEFt is the ratio of the federal deficit to 
real gross domestic product.  All other variables  are described in the notes 
to Table 2. 













FIGURE  1 




I  ’  I  ’  I  ’  I  ’  I  ’  I  ’  I  ’  I  ’  I  ’  I  ’  I  ’  I  ’  I  ’  I  ’  I  ’  1’1’1’1 

























Figure  3 
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Kalman Filter Estimates  of Coefficients  & 95% Confidence 
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'Bernanke  and Mishkin (19921  discuss the historical  experience  with monetary 
targeting in several countries including  the U.S.  The argue that not only do 
monetary targets  provide an important  signal to the public, but they also help 
to insulate  central banks from political  pressure to pursue more expansionary 
policies. 
2  This idea has a long history in economics,  dating back at least to Irving 
Fisher (1925).  For a more recent  discussion  of this issue,  see Leijonhufvud 
(19851.  The theoretical  link  between monetary target credibility  and price 
level  uncertainty is modeled by Ireland (19931. 
3  To guard against this possibility,  Hardouvelis  and Barnhart also examine the 
response  of a short-term interest  rate to unanticipated  growth in the money 
supply.  As long as money surprises  have a positive  and significant impact on 
nominal interest  rates, money surprises  have not lost their information 
content and the commodity  price responses  contain information  about the 
credibility  of Federal Reserve policy.  Although  Hardouvelis  and Barnhart find 
a significant  positive relationship  between interest  rates and money surprises 
for most of their sample, the relationship  begins to deteriorate in 1983 and 
1984 thus suggesting  a gradual loss in the information  content of Ml 
announcements. 
4  The Federal Reserve began using quarterly  averages  of the money stock rather 
than monthly averages  beginning in July of 1975.  This was done in recognition 
of the fact that monthly fluctuations  were excessively  volatile. 
5  In addition, the Humphrey-Hawkins  Act required the Federal Reserve to explain 
deviations from the targets to Congress.  This measure was intended to make 
the Federal Reserve accountable  for movements in the money supply. 6  In the face of 
associated  with 
Thus Base drift 
persistent  and unexpected  changes in velocity, the cost 
bringing the money stock back into the target ranges rises. 
and persistent  deviations  of the money stock from its target 
level  may be the desired policy in the face of unexpected changes in velocity. 
See Walsh (19861  for a discussion  of this issue. 
7  For the period prior to October 1979  when the FMOC set near-term targets  with 
one month horizons,  we use the money stock for the second month of the quarter 
and apply the near-term target to it to get the desired deviation at the end 
of the quarter. 
8  The minutes from the FMOC meetings  during 1986 suggest that the large money 
stock deviations  were due to both desired and undesired sources.  For example, 
at the July meeting the FMOC acknowledged  that changes in Ml velocity forced 
them to let Ml money growth exceed the target levels: 
Because of the substantial  uncertainties  surrounding  the 
behavior of Ml in relation to economic  activity and prices 
and the substantial  decline in velocity in the first half 
of the year, the Committee  decided that  Ml growth in excess 
of the previously  established  3 to 8 percent range would be 
acceptable for the year. 
However, the issue of controlability  rises at the August 19 meeting: 
. . . growth in Ml was expected to moderate from the exceptionally 
large increase  during the second  quarter.  With the prospective 
behavior of Ml remaining  subject to unusual uncertainty,  the 
Committee again decided not to specify  a rate of expected  growth 
in the operational  paragraph  of the directive... 
9  Formally known as The Goldsmith-Nagan  Bond and Money Market Letter. 
10  The Report usually mails the surveys  on the second or third  Friday of the 
last  month of the quarter.  Most surveys are returned  and the mean forecasts 
published  within two weeks after the surveys  are distributed. 
llThe  group forecasts  Ml-A growth during 1980 and Ml-B growth during 1981. 12  For example, the group stopped  forecasting  Ml and began forecasting  M2 during 
the fourth quarter of 1982 following  Federal  Reserve Chairman Volker's October 
1982 announcement  that the Ml target  was no longer in effect. 
13  For example, see Froot (1989)  and Ferderer  and Shadbegian (1993).  The latter 
paper show that term premia estimated  using interest  rate forecasts from the 
Report are more sensitive to changes in market risk than are term premia 
estimated  using other measures of expectations. 
14  This involves  using the ROBUSTERRORS  option in the RATS LINREG command  with 
LAGS set equal to 1. 
15  Contemporaneous  money growth is measured  using the projected money growth 
over the quarter provided by the  Report.  We use this measure rather than 
actual money growth because the latter is not known by the group when they 
make their forecasts. 
16  See Blackburn and Christensen (1989)  for a good discussion  of these factors. 
17  For this reason,  Friedman (1988,  p. 65) concludes  that "After  mid-1982 there 
was no reason for anyone to find the Federal  Reserve's commitment to its 
stated money growth targets credible." 18  In particular, they discuss the work of Sargent (19811  and Baxter (1985). 
Sargent argues that the severe hyperinflations  in Austria, Germany, Hungary 
and Poland in the 1920s  were brought to an end with small real costs because 
the regime put in place to eliminate the inflation  was credible.  This 
credibility  was achieved  by: i) a return to the gold standard; ii) the 
establishment  of independent  central  banks, and iii)  government commitments to 
balance their budgets.  Baxter focuses on the anti-inflation  policy reforms 
undertaken in Argentina and Chile in the late 1970s.  To measure the 
credibility  of these reforms, she uses a Bayesian approach to measure the 
public's subjective  probability that the reforms  would be maintained.  The 
results suggest that the government in Argentina  was not able to maintain 
credibility  because they undertook actions that  were inconsistent  with the new 
regime.  That is, unscheduled  devaluations  and large  government  deficits. 
19  Figures 6 and 7 indicate  that coefficients  on all explanatory  variables in 
(4)  are time-varying  and this finding suggests that Xt should be interacted 
with each of these variables.  However, this approach is not practical given 
the limited  number of available  observations. 
20  In contrast to Figures 1 and 2, the series  used to construct the one show in 
Figure 8 are estimated  using the quarterly  average of the money stocks rather 
than the money stock in the last money of each quarter.  The latter  approach 
was used earlier in the paper so that  we could compare  near-term and annual 
targets.  However, since the third  quarter of 1975 the Federal Reserve has 
specified that the annual targets  apply to quarter-over-quarter  growth. 21  The fact that we used the 1978:Q2 to 1980:Q4  sample to initialize  the Kalman 
filter estimates  makes it difficult to evaluate the evolution of credibility 
prior to 1981 in Figure 7.  However, if the p coefficient  followed a smooth 
path over the initialization  period, a path that connects the initialization 
period coefficient  at 1979:Q3  and the Kalman filter value observed in 1981:Ql, 
its average value over the 1979:Q4  to 1982:3  period is not much different from 
the full sample average. 